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Income distribution and growth: A global model 
  
Abstract 
This article estimates the effects of a change in the wage share on growth at global level in 
the G20 countries. A decrease in the wage share in isolation leads to lower growth in the euro area, 
Germany, France, Italy, UK, US, Japan, Turkey, and Korea, whereas it stimulates growth in Canada, 
Australia, Argentina, Mexico, China, India, and South Africa.  However, a simultaneous decline in 
the wage share in all these countries leads to a decline in global growth. Furthermore, Canada, 
Argentina, Mexico, and India also experience negative effects on growth when they decrease their 
wage-share along with their trading partners. The results indicate that the global decline in labour 
share has had significant negative effects on growth.   
Key words: wage share, growth, global multiplier, consumption, investment, exports, imports, G20, 
developed and developing countries 
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1. Introduction 
There has been a significant decline in the share of wages in GDP in both the developed and 
developing countries following the 1980s. The reasons for the fall in the wage shares have recently 
been the subject of a growing literature trying to pin down the effects of technology, globalization, 
financialisation, changes in the bargaining power of labour, and welfare state retrenchment (IMF, 
2007; EC, 2007; ILO, 2011; Rodrik, 1997; Stockhammer, 2013). This article aims at estimating the 
effects of this change in the primary functional income distribution between wages and profits on 
growth at a global level.  
During this period there has been also an increase in personal income inequality. Daudey and 
Garcia-Penalosa (2007) and Jäntti (1997) show that the rise of personal income inequality is related 
to changes in the wage share. Wolff and Zacharias (2007) find that the increase in inter-class 
inequality was the fundamental cause of the increase in personal income inequality. The distribution 
of personal income depends on the distribution of labour and capital endowments, and the way in 
which aggregate output is shared between the two. If the distribution of capital is more unequal than 
that of labour, a decrease in the labour share would increase personal income inequality (Daudey and 
Garcia-Penalosa, 2007; Dafermos and Papatheodorou, 2011). Atkinson (2009) argues that the 
analysis of functional income distribution is important to understand personal income inequality as 
well as to address issues of social justice. 
The decline in the wage share and rise in personal income inequality has accompanied a poor 
performance in terms of growth in most countries. The relation between personal income inequality 
and growth has been a field of ongoing controversy (Barro, 2000). Early work by Kuznets (1955) 
and Kaldor (1956) argues that higher inequality would generate higher savings, more investment and 
thus higher growth in the early stages of development but in the later stages trickle down effects 
result in higher per capita income and lower inequality. In support of the thesis that inequality fosters 
growth, Mirrlees (1971) emphasizes the negative effects of redistribution through taxation on the 
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incentives to work. Aghion et.al. (1999) suggest that inequality can lead to a higher concentration of 
wealth that could overcome problems of poorly functioning credit markets. However, competing 
theories indicate various channels through which inequality can impede growth. Galor and Zeira 
(1993) highlight the negative effects of credit market imperfections on human capital accumulation 
and show that richer economies are more equal than poorer ones. Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and 
Persson and Tabellini (1994) argue that greater inequality increases public support for redistribution, 
which leads to higher tax rates on capital, discourages investment and hinders growth.  Alesina and 
Perotti (1996) find that inequality increases political instability and uncertainty, and impede 
investments. 
 This article analyses the effects of increasing inequality on growth focusing on functional 
income distribution, and its effects on demand. We use a Post-Keynesian/Post-Kaleckian theoretical 
framework (Dutt, 1984; Blecker, 1989; Bhaduri and Marglin, 1990). The contribution of this 
framework to the research on inequality and growth is to bring in the role of demand in determining 
growth in economies operating below full employment, and to show the role of wages as a source of 
demand, and not just a component of cost. With regards to the effects of distribution on demand, 
consumption is expected to decrease when the wage share decreases since the marginal propensity to 
consume out of capital income is lower than that out of wage income. A higher profit share is 
expected to stimulate investment. Finally, net exports will depend negatively on unit labour costs, 
which are closely related to the wage share.  Thus, the total effect of the decrease in the wage share 
on demand depends on the relative size of the effects on consumption, investment and net exports. If 
the total effect is negative, the demand regime is called wage-led; otherwise the regime is profit-led.1 
                                                 
1 The rise in personal income inequality is also expected to have a negative effect on consumption, 
since the marginal propensity to consume out of high income is lower than that out of low income. 
The advantage of working with functional income distribution instead of personal income is that the 
same variable, wage share, has an effect on not just consumption but also investment and net exports, 
and aggregating the effects of inequality on demand becomes feasible.  
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The Post-Keynesian models show that the relationship between the wage share and growth is 
an empirical matter, which depends on the structural characteristics of the economy. This is in 
striking contrast to mainstream economic policy -e.g. the European Commission (2006) argues that 
wage moderation, i.e. real wage growth below productivity growth, is the key to preserve growth and 
jobs in a competitive global economy.   
The theoretical novelty of this article is that it goes beyond an isolated single country as the 
unit of analysis and develops a global model. What happens to global demand when there is a 
simultaneous decline in the wage share as has been the case in the post-1980s period? To the best of 
our knowledge, this article is the first in the literature to develop and estimate a model of the global 
effects of changes in income distribution.   
The second contribution is the inclusion of the developing countries. Most of the previous 
empirical work on the effects of functional income distribution on growth has focused on developed 
countries (e.g., Onaran, et al, 2011; Stockhammer, et al, 2011; Stockhammer, et al, 2009; Hein and 
Vogel, 2008; Naastepad and Storm, 2007; Bowles and Boyer, 1995) with only few exceptions on 
developing countries (Molero Simarro, 2011 and Wang, 2009; Jetin and Kurt, 2011; Onaran and 
Stockhammer, 2005).  
We first estimate the effect of the wage share on each component of private demand 
(consumption, investment, and net exports) in the major developed and developing countries; these 
constitute more than 80% of the global GDP.  Next, we calculate the global effects based on the 
responses of each country to changes not only in domestic income distribution but also to trade 
partners’ wage share; this in turn affects the import prices and foreign demand for each country.   
The rest of the article is organized as follows: section two discusses data and stylized facts. 
Section three presents the model. Sections four and five discuss the estimation methodology and the 
results. Section six concludes.  
2. Data and stylized facts 
5 
 
We focus on the sixteen developed and developing economies, which are members of G20 
and have wage share data for a sufficiently long time period: Euro area (12 West European Member 
States), Germany, France, Italy, UK, US, Japan, Canada, Australia, Turkey, Mexico, South Korea, 
Argentina, China, India, and South Africa.   
Appendix A describes the data sources. The estimation period is 1960-2007 for the developed 
countries, and 1970-2007 for the developing countries (1978-2007 for China). The period after the 
2008 crisis are excluded, since it would be impossible to test for possible structural breaks with only 
few observations.    
C, I, X, M, Y, W and R are consumption expenditures, private investment expenditures, 
exports, imports, GDP (at market prices), wages and profits respectively, all in real terms.  
Wages are adjusted labour compensation, calculated as real compensation per employee 
multiplied by total employment.2 In the national accounts, all income of the self-employed are 
classified as operating surplus. Since part of this is a return to the labour of the self-employed, the 
unadjusted labour compensation underestimates the labour income. This is a particular problem for 
the developing countries with high numbers of self-employed workers in the informal economy. 
Profit is also adjusted gross operating surplus, calculated as GDP at factor cost minus adjusted labour 
compensation. Profit share, π, is adjusted gross operating surplus as a ratio to GDP at factor cost, Yf. 
Wage share, ws, is 1- π. 
One issue with the adjustment in the developing countries is that the wages of the self-
employed in the informal economy would be significantly lower than the average formal wage. 
However, ignoring the labour income of the self-employed would mean a serious underestimation of 
the labour income.  
                                                 
2 For China and India mixed methodologies are used.  
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Figure 1 shows the indices of the adjusted wage share. There is a secular decline in the wage 
share in all countries starting from late 1970s or early 1980s onwards. The fall is slightly lower in the 
US and UK, which may be related to the increase in managerial wages.  
<Figure 1 > 
The developing world have experienced stronger declines in the wage share, particularly 
during the debt crisis, the initial phases of structural adjustment and the currency crises of the 1990s 
and 2000s. Even in Korea, the increase in the wage share from mid-1980s onwards was reversed by 
the crisis in 1997. In China the improvement in the wage share in the 1980s was reversed in 1990.  
Table B.1 in the Appendix shows the average growth rates in GDP. In the developed 
countries, the decline in the wage share was associated with a weaker growth. Similarly, the 
developing countries in the post-1980s period, with the exception of China and India, have lower 
growth rates as compared to the 1970s.   
3. A global model 
We model the effects of the changes in the profit share on growth by means of analyzing the 
country level effects on private demand, i.e. consumption, investment, exports, and imports, as well 
as the global interactions resulting from the effects of a change in the profit share of other countries. 
Consumption, C, is modelled as a function of adjusted profits, R, and adjusted wages, W:  
WcRccC wro ++=         (1) 
We calculate the marginal effect of a change in the profit share on C by multiplying the 
estimated coefficients of R and W by C/R and C/W (at the mean of our sample) respectively: 
W
Cc
R
Cc
YR
YC
WR −=∂
∂
)/(
)/(
      (2)
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This is equivalent to the difference in marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of profits 
and wages, and is expected to be negative.3  
Private investment, I, is modelled as a positive function of output (the accelerator effect), and 
the profit share as a proxy for expected profitability as well as the availability of internal finance: 
ππiYiiI YA ++=
       
(3) 
where Ai  is autonomous investment, and all parameters are expected to be positive.
4  
The marginal effect of π on I/Y is calculated as follows:  
R
Ii
YR
YI
π=∂
∂
)/(
)/( .         (4) 
The details of the derivation of the marginal effects are in Appendix C. 
We model the effects of distribution on net exports via the stepwise approach of 
Stockhammer, et al. (2009) and Onaran, et al. (2011). Exports (X) are a function of export/import 
prices (Px/Pm) and the GDP of the rest of the world (Yrw); imports (M) are a function of domestic 
prices/import prices (P/Pm) and GDP; domestic prices (P) and export prices (Px) are functions of 
nominal unit labour cost (ulc) and import prices (Pm). The exchange rate is included in export and 
import estimations wherever significant.  
                                                 
3 In the developing countries, we also test whether the MPC differs between rural and urban regions 
by augmenting Equation (2) with agricultural GDP, Ya. The coefficient of Ya is the difference 
between MPC in different regions.   
4 The long-term real interest rate is excluded since it was not statistically significant. In developing 
countries, we also add Ya in order to account for the differences in investment in agriculture, and 
government investments, Ig, to test crowding-in or crowding-out effects.  
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We calculate the marginal effect of a change in the wage share on exports/GDP as follows:  
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where 
xP
e is the effect of ulc on Px, and XPe is the effect of Px on exports. The wage share is 
real unit labour cost (rulc) multiplied by GDP at market prices/GDP at factor cost (Y/Yf). The total 
effect of a change in the ws on exports includes the effect of rulc on ulc5, the effect of ulc on prices, 
and the effect of Px on exports. The average values of rulc
YX /  for the sample mean are used to convert 
the elasticity to marginal effect.  A similar procedure is followed for imports 
The sum of the partial effects of a change in π on consumption, investment, and net exports 
on demand is the effect on private excess demand. The initial change in private excess demand will 
further affect consumption, investment, and imports via the multiplier mechanism.  
The paper focuses on private demand, and does not investigate how government expenditures 
react to changes in income distribution, but as far as government expenditures and taxes influence 
GDP, it will affect investment, consumption and imports via multiplier effects. We also estimate the 
effects of government investment on private investment. A related research question would be how 
various taxes affect profit and wage income, and hence consumption. This is not possible with 
readily available data for all countries and would constitute a research question in its own right. 
3.1 The global interactions 
                                                 
5 The effect of real unit labor cost on nominal unit labor cost is 
perulc
ulc
−
=
∂
∂
1
1
)(
)( , where pe is the 
effect of ulc on domestic prices.   
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Next we incorporate the global effects of a change in π simultaneously in all the economies. 
A change in π of other countries affects the aggregate demand of each economy via the effects of 
changes in imports prices and the GDP of trade partners on its net exports.  
For the case of n countries, the percentage change in the GDP of each country is 
⎣
⎢
⎢
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𝑑𝑑1
𝑑1
⋮
𝑑𝑑𝑛
𝑑𝑛 ⎦
⎥
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 (6) 
where the matrices E and H represent only the effects of a change in each country’s own π on 
demand in that country. Matrices P and W add the effects of changes in imports prices and the GDP 
of trade partners on the net exports of each country on top of these national effects. E is a matrix, 
whose diagonal elements are the effect of a change in a country’s own π on private excess demand in 
that country.  H reflects the national multiplier effects in country i as an outcome of changes in 
private excess demand in that country. P shows the effect of a change in a trade partner’s π, hence 
import prices on the net exports of each country. W shows the effects of a change in a trade partner’s 
GDP on the exports of each country. The details are in Appendix D. 
Solving Equation (6) for �𝑑𝑑
𝑑
�, we get the equivalent of a global cumulative/multiplier effect: 
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎡
𝑑𝑑1
𝑑1
⋮
𝑑𝑑𝑛
𝑑𝑛 ⎦
⎥
⎥
⎤ = (𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝐻𝑛𝑛𝑛 −𝑊𝑛𝑛𝑛)−1(𝐸𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑛) �𝛿𝛿1⋮
𝛿𝛿𝑛
�   (7) 
So far both theoretical and empirical research has focused on the national effects, and ignored 
the spatial effects due to the simultaneous changes in distribution in the global economy. However, 
ignoring this spatial interaction overestimates the positive effects of a fall in the wage share. Higher 
openness of an economy increases the relevance of the positive effects of a fall in the wage share due 
to a higher share of net exports; however globalisation is not an isolated phenomenon, and there has 
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been a global contagion of wage moderation policies as countries tried to compete based on wage 
costs. This, in turn, decreases the effects of a fall in the wage share on net exports when it is 
implemented simultaneously across countries as relative prices of exports and imports do not change 
much when all countries reduce their unit labour costs. Understanding the full effects of the fall in 
the wage share requires a global analysis of the economic geography of inequality and its 
consequences via spatial interactions. 
4. Estimation methodology 
We analyze the effects of the changes in the wage share on growth by means of estimating 
single equations for consumption, investment, exports, and imports for each country as is widely 
used in the literature (e.g., Onaran, et al, 2011; Stockhammer, et al, 2009; Hein and Vogel, 2008; 
Naastepad and Storm, 2007).   
Unit root tests suggest that most of our variables are stationary only in their first differences. 
Only π is stationary in the UK, Italy, Turkey, and Argentina.  Error-correction models (ECM) are 
applied wherever significant.6 Otherwise specifications in difference form are estimated.   
We start with a general specification with both the contemporaneous values and first lags of 
the variables as well as a lagged dependent variable.  Then the specification with only significant 
values is chosen. Wherever there is autocorrelation, either the lagged dependent variable is kept, or 
an AR(1) term is added. Long-term elasticities are calculated for finding the marginal effects. 
The single-equation approach has some advantages. It allows for a flexible modelling of the 
individual behavioural equations. However, there are three issues, which may cause a bias in the 
estimations. First, functional income distribution is assumed to be exogenous. Obviously this is not 
the case, e.g. lower growth and higher unemployment will have a negative effect on the wage share; 
                                                 
6 We use the t-ratios reported by Banerjee et al. (1998) for the speed of adjustment coefficient to test the significance of 
cointegration. 
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however this works usually with a time lag. By assuming exogeneity, we are implying that the time 
lag of this effect is longer than one year. Endogenizing income distribution is not feasible in the 
absence of good instrumental variables and long time series data, which could allow for using own 
lags of the distribution variables as instruments. Second, the single equation approach fails to utilize 
the fact that consumption, investment and net exports add up to private demand.  
The main alternative, a VAR approach (as used by Stockhammer and Onaran (2004), Onaran 
and Stockhammer (2005), Barbosa-Filho and Taylor (2006)), would require substantially simplifying 
the model as these models cannot handle more than five endogenous variables. Such simplification is 
likely to lead to misspecification of the behavioural functions. Furthermore the results of VAR 
estimations are more difficult to interpret. It is not possible to detect and decompose the precise 
economic relationships that lead to changes in demand in response to distribution. Nevertheless, the 
convenience of interpretation of the results of the single equation approach comes at the price of 
some potential bias because the system-dimension and endogeneity are ignored. 
Third, the global effects are calculated based on the separately estimated effects for each 
country. A Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) approach was tested, however the correlation of 
the error terms across the country specific equations were not significant; thus we could not reject the 
hypothesis of independence. 
5. Estimation Results 
The estimations results for consumption are in Table 1. The hypothesis that the MPC out of 
profits and wages vary is confirmed in all countries. In cases where either of the lags of W or R is 
significant, we also kept the insignificant lag, since the sum of W and R gives the total income.       
< Table 1> 
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The results for investment are summarized in Table 2.7 In the US, Turkey, Korea, India, and 
China π has no significant effect.8 In all countries, GDP has a strong significant effect on private 
investment. Furthermore, in Korea, India, and China public investment has a significant positive 
effect. The importance of industrial policy may explain the lack of statistically significant effect of 
profits in Korea and China.    
<Table 2> 
The results for exports, imports and prices are in Tables 3-6. In Turkey, Mexico, and South 
Africa there are no significant effect of export prices on exports; so we estimate exports as a function 
of rulc. In South Africa there were no significant effects again. In the euro area and Germany there 
are no significant effect of either prices or rulc on imports. 
<Tables 3-6> 
Table E.1 in Appendix E summarizes the marginal effect of a change in π on X/Y and M/Y. 
This effect not only depends on the elasticity of exports and imports to prices but also on the share of 
exports and imports in GDP. Thus in relatively small open economies the effect becomes much 
larger compared to the large closed economies.    
                                                 
7 In the UK and Argentina, since π is stationary, the ECM vector includes only I and Y; π enters the 
specification as its level. In Italy and Turkey π is used in its level form in the difference 
specifications, since it is stationary. Ya is significant only in South Africa.   
8 Seguino (1999), Onaran and Yentürk (2001), Onaran and Stockhammer (2005), Hein and Vogel 
(2008) similarly find no significant effects of π on investment. Onaran, et al. (2011) show that when 
the interest and dividend payments are deducted from profits, there is a positive effect of the profit 
share on investment in the US. The effect of π on private investment in China is also insignificant, 
although there is a positive effect on total investment including public investment. Molero Simarro 
(2011) and Wang (2009) also find a positive effect of profits on total investment.   
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5.1 National effects 
Table 7 summarizes the effects of a 1%-point increase in π on consumption, investment, 
exports, and imports.   
<Table 7>  
The first column reports the partial effects on consumption, i.e. the differences in 
consumption propensities. The MPC out of profits is lower than that out of wages in all countries; 
thus a rise in π leads to a decline in consumption.  The second column reports the partial effects of π 
on investment. If we sum up only the effects on domestic private demand (i.e., consumption and 
investment) the negative effect of the increase in π on consumption is substantially larger than the 
positive effect on investment in absolute value in all countries. Thus demand in the domestic sector 
is clearly wage-led; however, the foreign sector then has a crucial role in determining whether the 
economy is profit-led.    
Column F sums up the partial effects on private demand when π increases in each country in 
isolation. Overall demand in the euro area as well as Germany, France, Italy, UK, US, and Japan is 
wage-led. The results indicate that large/relatively closed economies are rather wage-led than profit-
led.9  
                                                 
9 Our results are consistent with Stockhammer, et al. (2009), Stockhammer, et al. (2011), Hein and 
Vogel (2008), Ederer and Stockhammer (2007), and Onaran, et al. (2011). Bowles and Boyer (1995) 
find similar results for the US and UK, but profit-led regimes in Germany, France, and Japan, 
however there are unit root problems. Naastepad and Storm (2007) find profit-led regimes in the US 
and Japan, but these results are driven by the unconventional finding that the domestic demand is 
profit-led. They find similar results to us for Germany, France, Italy, the UK.  Stockhammer and 
Onaran (2004) estimate a VAR model, and conclude that the impact of distribution on demand is 
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Canada and Australia are profit-led; as small open economies the net export effects are high; 
the investment effects are also among the highest, and the consumption effects are among the lowest.  
Among the developing countries, only Turkey and Korea are wage-led10. China is very 
strongly profit-led; however this effect is not due to investment, but rather results from the very 
strong net export effects due to a very high elasticity of prices to unit labour costs, indicating a 
highly labour intensive export structure as well as the highly price-elastic character of exports such 
as textiles. South Africa is also strongly profit-led due to a low difference in the MPC out of profits 
and wages. Mexico and Argentina also have profit-led regimes; in Mexico a strong effect of profits 
on both investment and net exports, and in Argentina a low MPC differential explain the results. 
India is profit-led but the effect of distribution is rather low; a high net export effect slightly offsets 
the low effect on consumption.  
Column G reports the multiplier calculated using the elasticities of C, I, and M with respect to 
Y. The details are in Appendix F. The multiplier is larger than one in all cases. When the multiplier 
effects are taken into consideration the effect of a change in distribution on demand becomes higher 
as can be seen in Column H. 
5.2. Global effects 
Finally we analyze the global effects of a simultaneous 1%-point increase in π in all the 
economies. Column I in Table 8 summarizes the results.  
Most interestingly, four profit-led countries, Canada, India, Mexico and Argentina, also start 
contracting after incorporating the effects of decreasing import prices and the GDP of trade partners. 
Thus, the expansionary effects of an increase in the profit share are reversed when relative 
                                                                                                                                                                    
weak. Again using VAR methodology Barbosa-Filho and Taylor (2006) find that the US is profit-
led; however there are serious autocorrelation issues. 
10 Onaran and Stockhammer (2005) also find that Turkey and Korea are wage-led. 
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competitiveness effects are reduced as all countries are implementing a similar wage competition 
strategy.  Comparing columns H and I, the wage-led economies experience stronger negative effects 
on demand now. The euro area, the UK, and Japan have 0.18-0.25% lower demand than otherwise. 
In Turkey, Korea, and the US the negative effects on demand reaches to 0.72-0.92%. Australia, 
South Africa, and China are the only countries that can continue to grow out of a simultaneous 
increase in π. However, the growth rates in these countries are also reduced in comparison.  
Overall a 1%-point simultaneous decline in the wage share in these economies leads to a 
decline in the global GDP growth by 0.36%-points (the average of the growth rates in column I 
weighted by the share of each country in the world GDP). Hence, it is possible to find an alternative 
scenario, where all countries can grow along with an increase in the wage share, although the extent 
at which wage share can recover is more moderate in the profit-led countries compared to the wage-
led countries. 
Finally, we checked the robustness of the results with respect to the adjusted wage share 
variable, since adjusting for the labour income of the self-employed is a challenge particularly for the 
developing countries. When the estimations are done using unadjusted wage share, the MPC 
differences are in general lower. This indicates that it is intuitively correct to adjust for the labour 
income of the self employed: MPC from unadjusted profit income is much higher compared to that 
out of adjusted profit income, since unadjusted profits incorporate self employed labour income with 
a relatively higher MPC.  Nevertheless in most countries this does not lead to a change in the 
character of the regime. However in Korea, when unadjusted wages are used, the regime seems to be 
profit-led rather than wage-led primarily due to much lower MPC differences. In Mexico, the effect 
of the profit share on investment becomes insignificant, and therefore the regime seems to be wage-
led rather than profit-led. Overall, these differences do not affect the global results. 
6. Conclusions 
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Our empirical estimations show that a simultaneous decline in the wage share in a highly 
integrated global economy leads to a decline in global growth, although the magnitude of the effect 
is not large. A cautious interpretation would suggest that an increase in the wage share and equality 
is not a barrier to growth if implemented simultaneously at the global level. Our results indicate that 
the contractionary effects of a fall in the wage share on consumption outweigh the expansionary 
effects on investment in all countries, a robust result consistent with previous research. Therefore, a 
simultaneous decline in the wage share in the world cannot possibly have expansionary effects on the 
global economy, since net export effects are fundamentally wiped out. Despite the potential biases 
that may result from endogeneity issues and single equation based estimations, our results are 
consistent with the intuition that the world as a whole is a closed economy. Hence, one result stands 
out:  planet earth in aggregate is wage-led. 
 The results indicate that the micro rationale of pro-capital redistribution conflicts with the 
macro outcomes: First, in a wage-led economy the consequence of a higher profit share at the 
macroeconomic level is lower demand; thus even though a higher profit share at the firm level seems 
to be beneficial to individual employers, at the macroeconomic level a generalized fall in the wage 
share generates a problem of realization of profits due to deficient demand. Second, in the profit-led 
countries even if increasing profit share seems to be promoting growth at the national level, at the 
global level a generalized fall in the wage share leads to a global demand deficiency. What seems to 
be rational at the level of an individual firm or a country turns out to be contractionary at the macro 
or global level.   
These results have important policy conclusions. First, if a country is wage-led, increasing 
equality is not an impediment to growth. Second, for the large economic areas with low extra-
regional trade, like the euro area, which tend to be wage-led, macroeconomic policy coordination, in 
particular wage policy coordination, can improve growth and employment. There is also room for 
egalitarian and regional demand oriented growth via south-south cooperation in the developing 
17 
 
world. Third, a wage-led recovery as a way out of the global recession is feasible; an increase in the 
wage share could stimulate global growth, if the coordination problem among the countries can be 
overcome. Given the profit-led structures in some developing countries, the solution to the 
coordination problem requires the initiative of some large wage-led developed economies towards 
egalitarian growth. This in turn can create space for domestic demand-led growth strategies in the 
developing countries.  
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Figure 1 Wage share (adjusted, ratio to GDP at factor cost) 
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Table 1: Consumption: dependent variable dlog(C) 
c t-value dlog(Rt) t-value dlog(Wt) t-value DW R2 Sample
Euro area-12 0.006 3.110 *** 0.127 3.716 *** 0.739 15.406 *** 1.871 0.873 1961 2007   
Germany 0.007 2.439 ** 0.091 1.576  0.714 10.162 *** 1.954 0.713 1961 2007   
France 0.007 3.153 *** 0.137 4.717 *** 0.640 10.770 *** 2.120 0.771 1961 2007   
Italy 0.008 2.474 ** 0.167 4.101 *** 0.711 8.621 *** 1.515 0.705 1961 2007   
Australia 0.017 4.394 *** 0.098 3.295 *** 0.440 5.463 *** 1.831 0.411 1961 2007   
c t-value dlog(Rt) t-value dlog(Wt) t-value ar(1) t-value DW R2 Sample
UK 0.006 1.501  0.162 5.200 *** 0.735 6.852 *** 0.331 2.173 ** 1.838 0.683 1962 2007  
Canada 0.007 1.911 * 0.160 6.268 *** 0.659 6.852 *** 0.411 2.904 *** 1.935 0.725 1962 2007  
c t-value dlog(Rt) t-value dlog(Wt) t-value dlog(Rt-1) t-value dlog(Wt-1) t-value dlog(Ct-1) t-value DW R2 Sample
US 0.012 4.048 *** 0.181 4.968 *** 0.536 6.509 *** -0.114 -2.523 ** -0.140 -1.389  0.247 1.517  2.017 0.822 1962 2007
c t-value dlog(Rt-1) t-value dlog(Wt-1) t-value DW R2 Sample
Japan 0.011 2.256 ** 0.083 2.103 ** 0.611 6.747 *** 2.300 0.599 1962 2007   
c t-value dlog(Rt) t-value dlog(Wt) t-value dlog(Rt-1) t-value dlog(Wt-1) t-value dlog(Ct-1) t-value DW R2 Sample
Turkey 0.008 0.506  0.328 2.840 *** 0.316 2.432 ** 0.088 0.688  0.275 1.824 * -0.151 -0.873 1.803 0.320 1972 2006
c t-value dlog(Rt) t-value dlog(Wt) t-value DW R2 Sample
Korea -0.004 -0.411  0.072 3.820 *** 0.845 7.603 *** 2.073 0.641 1971 2007    
Argentina 0.003 0.575  0.430 7.927 *** 0.579 13.903 *** 1.944 0.855 1971 2007    
c t-value dlog(Rt) t-value dlog(Wt) t-value AR(1) t-value DW R2 Sample
Mexico 0.006 1.263  0.376 7.625 *** 0.566 17.015 *** 0.477 3.021 *** 1.878 0.905 1972 2007   
c t-value dlog(Rt) t-value dlog(Wt) t-value dlog(Rt-1) t-value dlog(Wt-1) t-value DW R2 Sample
China -0.011 -0.583  0.427 3.731 *** 0.428 1.923 * -0.186 -1.571  0.326 1.643 * 2.041 0.593 1980 2007  
c t-value dlog(Rt) t-value dlog(Wt) t-value dlog(Rt-1) t-value dlog(Wt-1) t-value dlog(Yat) t-value dlog(Yat- t-value DW R2 Sample
India 0.003 0.530  0.123 3.270 *** 0.586 4.317 *** 0.028 0.903  0.158 1.319  -0.009 -0.100  -0.168 -2.324 ** 1.894 0.809 1972 2007
c t-value dlog(Rt) t-value dlog(Wt) t-value dlog(Yat) t-value DW R2 Sample
South Africa 0.009 2.939 *** 0.312 9.030 *** 0.785 10.101 *** -0.061 -3.400 *** 1.926 0.781 1971 2007   
Note: *, **, and *** stand for 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels respectively
 23 
Table 2: Private Investment: dependent variable dlog(I) 
c t-value dlog(Yt) t-value dlog(πt) t-value dlog (It-1) t-value log (It-1) t-value log(Yt-1) t-value log(πt-1) t-value DW R2 Sample
Euro area-12 -0.304 -1.916 * 2.238 9.801 ** -0.137 -0.920  0.088 1.105  -0.203 -4.272 ** 0.207 4.545 ** 0.093 2.356 ** 1.820 0.865 1962 2007
Germany -0.136 -0.628  1.805 6.398 ** 0.058 0.284  0.183 1.683 * -0.292 -3.756 ** 0.266 4.283 ** 0.172 2.050 ** 1.829 0.748 1962 2007
c t-value dlog(πt-1) t-value dlog(Yt) t-value ar(1) t-value DW R2 Sample
France -0.027 -2.654 ** 0.139 1.657 * 2.050 10.505 *** 0.670 5.569 *** 1.832 0.822 1963 2007
c t-value log(πt-1) t-value dlog(Yt) t-value dlog(Yt-1) t-value DW R2 Sample
Italy 0.229 5.449 *** 0.241 6.084 *** 2.094 8.819 *** 0.516 2.421 ** 2.524 0.622 1962 2007
c t-value log(πt-1) t-value dlog(Yt) t-value log (It-1) t-value log(Yt-1) t-value DW R2 Sample
UK -1.143 -2.500 ** 0.212 2.513 ** 1.660 5.429 *** -0.350 -3.392 *** 0.458 3.278 *** 1.870 0.593 1961 2007
c t-value dlog(πt-1) t-value dlog(Yt) t-value dlog(Yt-1) t-value ar(1) t-value DW R2 Sample
US -0.061 -4.519 *** 0.077 0.510  2.738 14.501 *** 0.367 1.824 * 0.612 4.817 *** 1.697 0.858 1963 2007
c t-value dlog(πt) t-value dlog (It-1) t-value dlog(Yt) t-value dlog(Yt-1) t-value DW R2 Sample
Japan -0.019 -2.845 *** 0.185 2.615 ** 0.485 3.806 *** 1.982 12.339 *** -1.034 -3.221 *** 2.126 0.924 1962 2007
c t-value dlog(πt-1) t-value dlog(Yt) t-value DW R2 Sample  
Canada -0.020 -1.711 * 0.318 1.874 * 1.780 6.018 *** 1.593 0.530 1962 2007  
c t-value dlog(πt) t-value dlog(Yt) t-value DW R2 Sample  
Australia -0.025 -1.550  0.256 1.857 * 2.021 5.031 *** 1.821 0.494  1961 2007  
c t-value log(πt) t-value dlog(Yt) t-value DW R2 Sample
Turkey -0.056 -0.547  0.041 0.294  3.343 6.456 *** 1.743 0.567 1971 2006     
c t-value log(πt) t-value log(πt-1) t-value dlog(Yt) t-value dlog(Yt-1) t-value log (It-1) t-value log(Yt-1) t-value DW R2 Sample
Argentina 0.135 0.111  0.190 2.596 ** -0.147 -2.165 ** 2.808 19.169 0.325 2.001 ** -0.164 -3.138 *** 0.147 1.895 * 1.982 0.943 1972 2007
c t-value dlog(Yt) t-value dlog(πt) t-value dlog(πt-1) t-value dlog (It-1) t-value log (It-1) t-value log(Yt-1) t-value log(πt-1) t-value
Mexico -1.778 -2.722 ** 3.336 13.407 *** -0.349 -2.044 ** -0.259 -1.511 -0.040 -0.616  -0.343 -4.383 *** 0.482 3.765 *** 0.170 1.973 *
c t-value dlog(πt-1) t-value dlog(Yt) t-value dlog (Igt) t-value DW R2 Sample
Korea -0.110 -5.834 *** -0.011 -0.311  2.509 10.320 *** 0.186 1.960 1.589 0.816 1972 2007    
c t-value dlog(πt) t-value dlog (It-1) t-value dlog(Y) t-value dlog (Igt-1) t-value DW R2 Sample
China -0.061 -0.549  -1.642 -1.153  -0.184 -0.786  2.405 1.741 0.492 1.726 * 1.805 0.259 1980 2007   
c t-value dlog(πt) t-value dlog(Yt) t-value dlog (Igt-1) t-value DW R2 Sample
India -0.018 -0.682  -0.164 -1.190  1.561 3.856 *** 0.402 2.868 2.369 0.421 1972 2007    
c t-value dlog(πt-1) t-value dlog(Yt-1) t-value dlog (Yat-1) t-value DW R2 Sample
South Africa -0.010 -0.573  0.326 1.833 * 1.912 3.408 *** -0.179 -1.782 1.696 0.351 1972 2007    
Note: *, **, and *** stand for 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels respectively
 24 
Table 3: Price deflator: dependent variable dlog(P) 
c t-value dlog(ULCt-1) t-value dlog(Pmt) t-value DW R2 Sample
Euro area-12 0.014 3.518 *** 0.624 7.846 *** 0.123 2.915 *** 1.515 0.747 1962 2007  
Italy 0.018 3.525 *** 0.604 9.320 *** 0.202 4.988 *** 1.731 0.827 1962 2007  
UK 0.018 3.018 *** 0.568 6.713 *** 0.190 2.993 *** 2.039 0.691 1962 2007  
Japan 0.013 3.227 *** 0.516 6.833 *** 0.095 3.100 *** 1.666 0.630 1962 2007  
Canada 0.016 3.983 *** 0.459 5.335 *** 0.257 4.481 *** 1.447 0.678 1962 2007  
c t-value dlog(ULCt) t-value dlog(Pmt) t-value DW R2 Sample
Germany 0.012 8.103 *** 0.618 16.023 *** 0.031 1.428  1.491 0.864 1961 2007  
c t-value dlog(ULCt-1) t-value dlog(Pt-1) t-value dlog(Pmt) t-value DW R2 Sample
France 0.007 2.360 ** 0.275 2.141 ** 0.522 3.394 *** 0.086 3.281 *** 1.809 0.907 1962 2007
c t-value dlog(ULCt-1) t-value dlog(Pt-1) t-value dlog(Pmt) t-value dlog(Pmt-1) t-value DW R2 Sample
US 0.009 5.219 *** 0.211 2.710 ** 0.429 4.836 *** 0.109 8.403 *** 0.044 2.590 ** 1.745 0.951 1962 2007
c t-value dlog(ULCt) t-value dlog(Pmt) t-value dlog(Pmt-1) t-value DW R2 Sample
Australia 0.016 4.324 *** 0.624 8.856 *** -0.031 -0.579  0.150 3.429 *** 1.976 0.814 1962 2007
c t-value dlog(ULCt) t-value dlog(Pt-1) t-value dlog(Pmt) t-value DW R2 Sample
Turkey 0.011 0.643  0.354 5.402 *** 0.263 4.280 *** 0.364 7.124 *** 2.196 0.949 1972 2006
c t-value dlog(ULCt) t-value dlog(ULCt-1 t-value dlog(Pt-1) t-value dlog(Pmt) t-value DW R2 Sample
Mexico 0.008 0.884  0.700 8.642 *** -0.265 -2.136 ** 0.309 2.875 *** 0.261 7.178 *** 2.387 0.979 1972 2007
c t-value dlog(ULCt) dlog(Pmt) t-value dlog(Pmt-1) t-value DW R2 Sample
Korea 0.016 3.026 *** 0.735 10.508 *** 0.073 1.709 * 0.095 2.685 ** 1.887 0.912 1972 2007
c t-value dlog(ULCt) t-value dlog(Pmt) t-value DW R2 Sample
Argentina 0.002 0.162  0.640 17.025 *** 0.359 9.597 *** 1.828 0.994 1971 2007  
India 0.023 5.114 *** 0.756 12.205 *** 0.009 0.401  2.020 0.854 1971 2007  
South Africa 0.033 2.611 ** 0.618 5.634 *** 0.124 1.946 * 1.897 0.567 1971 2007  
c t-value dlog(ULCt) t-value dlog(Pt-1) t-value dlog(Pmt) t-value DW R2 Sample
China 0.009 1.643 * 0.771 7.480 *** 0.066 0.602  0.030 0.831 1.425 0.864 1979 2007
Note: *, **, and *** stand for 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels respectively
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Table 4: Export price deflator: dependent variable dlog(Px) 
c t-value dlog(ULCt-1) t-value dlog(Pxt-1) t-value dlog(Pmt) t-value DW R2 Sample
Euro area-12 0.003 1.670 * 0.165 3.141 *** 0.102 2.504 ** 0.566 27.168 *** 1.586 0.970 1962 2007   
Germany 0.004 1.557  0.216 2.845 *** 0.214 2.631 ** 0.355 9.780 *** 1.719 0.813 1962 2007   
Italy 0.004 0.960  0.178 2.616 ** 0.156 2.695 ** 0.569 19.040 *** 2.495 0.946 1962 2007   
c t-value log(Pxt-1) t-value log(ULCt-1) t-value log(Pmt-1) t-value dlog(ULCt) t-value dlog(Pmt) t-value ar(1) t-value DW R2 Sample
France 0.429 3.756 *** -0.663 -4.558 *** 0.098 1.710 * 0.475 5.253 *** -0.117 -1.131  0.545 17.814 *** 0.722 4.160 *** 1.760 0.962 1962 2007
c t-value log(Pxt-1) t-value log(ULCt-1) t-value log(Pmt-1) t-value dlog(ULCt) t-value dlog(Pmt) t-value DW R2 Sample
United Kingdom 0.043 1.592  -0.412 -3.895 *** 0.061 2.120 ** 0.342 4.132 *** 0.179 2.378 ** 0.575 12.748 *** 1.600 0.924 1961 2007
United States 0.374 3.479 *** -0.352 -3.238 *** 0.049 1.973 * 0.223 3.214 *** 0.397 2.765 *** 0.489 11.547 *** 1.929 0.913 1961 2007
c t-value dlog(ULCt) t-value dlog(Pmt) t-value DW R2 Sample
Japan -0.012 -4.226 *** 0.313 5.610 *** 0.389 16.889 *** 2.023 0.921 1961 2007    
Australia 0.014 1.263  0.374 1.798 * 0.316 2.121 ** 1.625 0.352 1961 2007    
c t-value dlog(ULCt) t-value dlog(ULCt-1) t-value dlog(Pmt) t-value DW R2 Sample
Canada 0.004 0.632  0.620 3.209 *** -0.472 -2.712 ** 0.820 8.822 *** 1.932 0.795 1962 2007   
c t-value dlog(ULCt-1) t-value dlog(Pmt) t-value DW R2 Sample
Turkey -0.013 -0.395  0.179 1.827 * 0.868 9.972 *** 2.277 0.851 1972 2007
c t-value dlog(ULCt) t-value dlog(Pmt) t-value DW R2 Sample
Mexico 0.014 0.830  0.260 2.514 ** 0.675 9.619 *** 2.112 0.925 1971 2007
Argentina 0.014 0.913  0.107 2.858 *** 0.878 23.456 *** 2.014 0.994 1971 2007
China -0.008 -0.773  0.322 2.234 ** 1.035 14.034 *** 1.772 0.905 1979 2007
India 0.022 1.259  0.693 2.879 *** 0.109 1.322  1.711 0.342 1971 2007
c t-value dlog(ULCt) t-value dlog(Pxt-1) t-value dlog(Pmt) t-value DW R2 Sample
Korea -0.013 -1.578  0.336 2.911 *** 0.009 0.127  0.614 9.198 *** 1.703 0.886 1972 2007
c t-value dlog(ULCt) t-value dlog(Pmt) t-value ar(1) t-value DW R2 Sample
South Africa 0.068 1.660 * -0.529 -1.516  0.957 6.374 *** 0.357 1.995 * 1.699 0.616 1972 2007
Note: *, **, and *** stand for 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels respectively
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Table 5: Exports: dependent variable dlog(X) 
c t-value dlog(Px/Pmt) t-value dlog(Xt-1) t-value dlog(Yrwt) t-value dlog(Et) t-value DW R2 Sample
Euro area-12 -0.021 -1.042  -1.304 -4.813 *** 0.161 1.460  1.884 3.821 *** 0.141 1.916 * 1.683 0.643 1971 2007
France -0.030 -2.151 ** -0.314 -2.204 ** 0.265 2.466 ** 2.065 5.952 *** 0.172 2.016 ** 1.765 0.601 1971 2007
c t-value dlog((Px/Pm)t-1) t-value dlog(Yrwt) t-value DW R2 Sample
Germany 0.000 0.002  -0.428 -1.967 * 1.779 2.911 *** 2.121 0.207 1971 2007  
c t-value dlog(Px/Pmt) t-value dlog(Yrwt) t-value DW R2 Sample
Italy -0.005 -0.266  -0.273 -1.760 * 1.554 3.028 *** 1.863 0.308 1971 2007  
UK 0.011 0.821  -0.519 -3.771 *** 1.057 2.885 *** 1.636 0.443 1971 2007  
Japan 0.014 0.617  -0.428 -4.039 *** 1.293 1.984 * 2.169 0.355 1971 2007  
Australia 0.036 1.782 * -0.235 -1.891 * 0.472 0.779  1.944 0.095 1971 2007  
c t-value dlog(Px/Pmt) t-value dlog(Yrwt) t-value dlog(Et-1) t-value ar(1) t-value DW R2 Sample
US -0.037 -1.990 * -0.286 -2.182 ** 2.935 6.099 *** 0.113 2.051 ** 0.517 3.427 *** 2.315 0.727 1972 2007
c t-value dlog((Px/Pm)t-1) t-value dlog(Xt-1) t-value dlog(Yrwt) t-value DW R2 Sample
Canada -0.026 -1.498  -0.558 -2.774 *** 0.172 1.371  2.056 4.163 *** 1.648 0.495 1971 2007
c t-value dlog(RULCt-1) t-value dlog(Yrwt) t-value DW R2 Sample
Turkey 0.051 0.794  -0.557 -1.903 * 0.899 0.488 2.454 0.100 1972 2007    
c t-value dlog(RULCt) t-value dlog(Yrwt) t-value ar(1) t-value DW R2 Sample
Mexico 0.005 0.160  -0.436 -2.095 ** 2.395 3.067 *** 0.463 2.713 ** 1.912 0.382 1972 2007   
c t-value log(Xt-1) t-value log(Px/Pmt-1t-value log(Yrwt-1) t-value dlog(Px/Pm t-value dlog(Xt-t-value dlog(Yrwt) t-value DW R2 Sample
Korea -42.041 -3.741 *** -0.396 -4.009 *** -0.198 -1.713 * 1.510 3.769 *** 0.256 0.964  0.082 0.592  3.213 3.262 *** 1.616 0.586 1972 2007
c t-value dlog(Px/Pmt) t-value dlog(Xt-1) t-value dlog(Yrwt) t-value DW R2 Sample
Argentina -0.053 -1.397  -0.318 -1.712 * 0.091 0.611  3.433 3.148 *** 1.715 0.257 1972 2007   
China 0.010 0.195  -1.175 -3.200 *** 0.396 2.556 ** 2.584 1.742 * 1.900 0.457 1980 2007   
India 0.084 2.371 ** -0.253 -2.364 ** 0.185 1.165  -0.220 -0.229  1.899 0.177 1972 2007   
c t-value dlog(Px/Pmt) t-value dlog(Yrwt) t-value DW R2 Sample
South Africa -0.007 -0.373  -0.126 -1.036  1.101 1.876 * 1.457 0.096 1971 2007    
Note: *, **, and *** stand for 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels respectively
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Table 6: Imports: dependent variable dlog(M) 
c t-value dlog((P/Pm)t-1) t-value dlog(Yt) t-value DW R2 Sample
Euro area-12 -0.008 -0.433  0.236 1.182  2.035 3.450 *** 1.537 0.329 1962 2007   
Italy -0.008 -0.759  0.233 2.390 ** 2.136 6.818 *** 2.219 0.607 1962 2007   
Japan 0.010 0.740  0.255 3.299 *** 1.136 4.576 *** 1.835 0.499 1962 2007   
c t-value dlog((P/Pm)t-1) t-value dlog(Yt) t-value ar(1) t-value DW R2 Sample
Germany 0.009 0.990  0.005 0.046  1.911 7.083 *** 0.283 1.848 * 1.903 0.618 1963 2007  
c t-value log(Mt-1) t-value log((P/Pm)t-1) t-value log(Yt-1) t-value dlog((P/Pm)t) t-value dlog(Yt) t-value DW R2 Sample
France -2.452 -4.565 *** -0.292 -3.932 *** 0.140 2.796 *** 0.573 4.330 *** 0.069 0.989  2.923 8.361 *** 2.166 0.782 1961 2007
United Kingdom -2.954 -4.748 *** -0.414 -4.773 *** 0.130 3.178 *** 0.769 4.814 *** -0.024 -0.388  1.698 8.584 *** 2.142 0.739 1961 2007
United States -4.610 -4.639 *** -0.414 -4.422 *** 0.177 3.755 *** 0.826 4.554 *** 0.132 1.651 * 2.341 9.783 *** 1.905 0.787 1961 2007
c t-value dlog(P/Pmt) t-value dlog(Yt) t-value DW R2 Sample
Australia -0.017 -0.823  0.558 2.964 *** 1.886 3.576 *** 2.081 0.374 1961 2007   
c t-value dlog(P/Pmt) t-value dlog(Yt) t-value dlog(Yt-1) t-value dlog(Mt-1) t-value DW R2 Sample
Canada 0.000 -0.008  0.356 2.570 ** 2.503 8.780 *** -1.636 -4.164 *** 0.424 3.369 *** 2.218 0.675 1962 2007
c t-value dlog(P/Pmt) t-value dlog(Yt) t-value DW R2 Sample
Turkey 0.019 0.525  0.546 2.363 ** 1.684 2.714 ** 1.809 0.390 1971 2007    
c t-value dlog((P/Pm)t-1) t-value dlog(Yt) t-value dlog(Et) t-value dlog(Et-1) t-value DW R2 Sample
Mexico -0.044 -0.967  0.472 2.508 ** 2.591 3.701 *** -0.236 -2.397 ** 0.368 4.112 *** 1.506 0.691 1972 2007  
C t-value dlog(P/Pmt) t-value dlog(Yt) t-value dlog(Mt-1) t-value AR(1) t-value DW R2 Sample
Korea -0.040 -1.322  0.254 1.703 * 2.265 8.287 *** -0.177 -1.420  0.390 2.003 ** 1.890 0.722 1973 2007  
c t-value log(Mt-1) t-value log((P/Pm)t-1) t-value log(Yt-1) t-value dlog((P/Pm)t) t-value dlog(Mt-1 t-value dlog(Yt) t-value DW R2 Sample
Argentina -27.542 -3.653 *** -0.536 -4.214 *** 0.400 4.148 *** 1.538 3.845 *** 0.385 4.594 *** 0.105 1.807 * 3.278 11.568 *** 1.762 0.917 1972 2007
c t-value log(Mt-1) t-value log((P/Pm)t-1) t-value log(Yt-1) t-value dlog((P/Pm)t-1) t-value dlog(Mt-1 t-value dlog(Yt) t-value DW R2 Sample
China -10.973 -4.401 *** -0.656 -4.055 *** 0.521 3.229 *** 0.984 4.237 *** -0.650 -2.569 ** 0.333 2.192 ** 2.690 3.869 *** 2.167 0.669 1980 2007
C t-value dlog((P/Pm)t) t-value dlog(Yt) t-value DLOG(M(t-1) t-value DW R2 Sample
India 0.049 1.871 * 0.546 4.984 *** 1.075 2.493 ** -0.079 -0.628  1.714 0.507 1972 2007   
c t-value log(Mt-1) t-value log((P/Pm)t-1) t-value log(Yt-1) t-value dlog((P/Pm)t) t-value dlog(Yt) t-value DW R2 Sample
South Africa -2.286 -2.367 ** -0.320 -6.037 *** 0.320 5.518 *** 0.383 5.624 *** 0.311 2.526 ** 4.065 12.071 *** 2.179 0.864 1971 2007
Note: *, **, and *** stand for 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels respectively 
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Table 7. The summary of the effects of a 1%-point increase in the profit share at the national and global level    
 
The effect of a 1%-point increase in the profit share in only one country on
C/Y I/Y X/Y M/Y NX/Y
private excess 
demand/Y Multiplier
% change in 
aggregate demand 
(F*G)
A B C D E (C-D) F (A+B+E) G H I
Euro area-12 -0.439 0.299 0.057 0.000 0.057 -0.084 1.590 -0.133 -0.245
Germany -0.501 0.376 0.096 0.000 0.096 -0.029 1.076 -0.031 -
France -0.305 0.088 0.036 -0.162 0.198 -0.020 1.388 -0.027 -
Italy -0.356 0.130 0.037 -0.089 0.126 -0.100 1.730 -0.173 -
United Kingdom -0.303 0.120 0.048 -0.110 0.158 -0.025 1.200 -0.030 -0.214
United States -0.426 0.000 0.006 -0.031 0.037 -0.388 2.080 -0.808 -0.921
Japan -0.353 0.284 0.028 -0.026 0.055 -0.014 2.407 -0.034 -0.179
Canada -0.326 0.182 0.063 -0.203 0.266 0.122 1.214 0.148 -0.269
Australia -0.256 0.174 0.049 -0.223 0.272 0.190 1.410 0.268 0.172
Turkey -0.491 0.000 0.140 -0.144 0.283 -0.208 2.208 -0.459 -0.717
Mexico -0.438 0.153 0.128 -0.253 0.381 0.096 1.108 0.106 -0.111
Korea -0.422 0.000 0.178 -0.181 0.359 -0.063 1.824 -0.115 -0.864
Argentina -0.153 0.015 0.014 -0.178 0.192 0.054 1.381 0.075 -0.103
China -0.412 0.000 1.095 -0.891 1.986 1.574 1.228 1.932 1.115
India -0.291 0.000 0.080 -0.230 0.310 0.018 2.180 0.040 -0.027
South Africa -0.145 0.129 0.000 -0.506 0.506 0.490 1.487 0.729 0.390
The effect of a 
simulataneous 1%-point 
increase on % change in 
aggregate demand 
(including effects of Yrw 
and Pm)
 
Note: Column A is calculated based on Equation 2, Column B is based on Equation 4, Column C-E are based on Table E.1 in the appendix. 
Column G is based on Table F.1 in the appendix. Column I is calculated as in Equation 7. We examine the Euro area as a single economic unit, 
and therefore do not include Germany, France, and Italy separately in the calculation of the global interactions in Column I.  
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Appendix A: Data sources and definitions 
ws: Adjusted wage share 
EU12, Germany, France, Italy, UK, US, Japan, Canada, Australia: AMECO 
Adjusted wage share = Compensation per employees * number of employed/ GDP at factor costs 
Korea, Mexico, Turkey: OECD STAT online  
Adjusted wage share=Compensation per employee*number of employed/value added at basic prices 
Argentina: 
1993-2005: Data supplied by Charpe, M. (2011), Adjusted wage share database, ILO/IILS , Geneva. 
Adjusted wage share= Compensation per employees * number of employed /GDP at basic prices  
1970-92 and 2006-07: data supplied by Lindenboim et al (2011);  
Unadjusted wage share=Compensation of employees / gdp at basic prices 
The adjusted and unadjusted wage share data are linked using %changes. 
China: 
Zhou et al (2010)’s adjusted wage share data calculated using the number of self-employed and national 
accounts data of China National Statistics Office, reported in Molero Simarro (2011). 
India: 
Own calculations based on data supplied by the Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation in the 
National Factor Income Summary Tables for 1970-74 and 1980-1999, and estimations supplied by Uma Rani 
Amara at the ILO/IILS for mixed income for 2000-2007 based on sectoral mixed income shares of 1999     
Adjusted wage share methodology 1: labour compensation/(national income at factor cost-mixed revenues) 
Adjusted wage share methodology 2:  labour compensation+Mixed revenues/National Income at factor cost 
Adjusted wage share average = average of adjusted wage share methodology 1 and 2 (as suggested by 
Gollin, 2002; Felipe and Sipin, 2004; and Jetin and Kurt 2011) 
1975-1979: UN National Account data; unadjusted wage share   
The unadjusted wage share data for 1975-79 is linked with the adjusted wage share data based on %changes. 
South Africa: 
1989-2004: Data supplied by Matthieu Charpe at the ILO/IILS; 
Adjusted wage Share = Compensation per employees * number of employed/ value added at basic prices 
1970-88 and 2005-07: UN national accounts, unadjusted wage share   
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The two series are linked using %changes. 
Other Data 
For the following variables, data for the OECD countries are from the AMECO database, and data for the 
other countries are from the World Bank World Development Indicators , unless otherwise stated: 
Y: GDP in market prices, real 
Yf: GDP at factor cost, real 
C: Private consumption, real; for Argentina missing data in WDI is linked with the data supplied by 
Lindenboim et al (2011) for 1980-1992 based on % changes. 
I:  Private Investment, real; for Turkey AMECO data for 1998-2006 is linked with data in State Planning 
Organisation for 1970-1998; for Korea OECD STAT online; for Mexico Sistema de Cuantas Nacionales de 
Mexico, Estadisticas historicas de Mexico 2009; for India Central Statistical Organisation; for South Africa 
The South African Reserve Bank, for Argentina data supplied by Lindenboim et al (2011);  for China private 
investment is calculated as total investment- investment by state owned and collective owned units based on 
the national accounts data of the National Bureau of Statistics 
P: GDP deflator 
PM : Import price deflator 
PX : Export price deflator 
X: Exports, real 
M: Imports, real 
Mji: Imports from country j to country I, IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, 1980-2007 for all countries 
E: Exchange rate; average of local currency per dollar, euro, and yen; WDI for all countries 
YrW: GDP of the rest of world, real; calculated as World GDP (in constant 2000 US$)-Own GDP (in 
constant 2000 US$), WDI, 1970-2007 for all countries 
W: Adjusted compensation of employees, real; calculated as W=ws*Yf  
π: Adjusted profit share; calculated as π=1-ws 
R:  Adjusted gross operating surplus, real; calculated as R= π*Yf 
rulc: Real unit labour costs; calculated as rulc= ws*Yf/Y 
ulc: Nominal unit labour costs; calculated as ulc=rulc*P 
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Appendix B 
Table B.1a Average growth of GDP (%), developed countries 
 
 
Euro area-12 Germany France Italy UK US Japan Canada Australia 
1961-69 5.30 4.39 5.71 5.77 2.90 4.69 10.14 5.37 5.53 
1970-79 3.78 3.27 4.15 4.02 2.42 3.32 5.21 4.11 3.07 
1980-89 2.27 1.96 2.31 2.55 2.48 3.04 4.37 3.04 3.35 
1990-99 2.15 2.32 1.86 1.43 2.24 3.21 1.46 2.44 3.32 
2000-07 2.13 1.53 2.10 1.46 2.73 2.61 1.73 2.92 3.31 
 
Table B.1b Average growth of GDP, %, Developing Countries  
  
 
Turkey Mexico Korea Argentina China India South Africa 
1970-79 4.86 6.41 10.27 2.92 6.11 2.68 3.03 
1980-89 4.08 2.21 8.62 -0.73 9.75 5.69 2.24 
1990-99 4.02 3.38 6.68 4.52 9.99 5.63 1.39 
2000-07 5.23 3.06 5.20 3.51 10.51 7.26 4.30 
 
Source: See Appendix A 
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Appendix C 
For each equation first the long term coefficients (elasticities) are calculated. In the ECM 
specifications, long-term elasticities are calculated by dividing the statistically significant 
coefficient of the log-level of the explanatory variable by the negation of the speed of adjustment 
coefficient (coefficient of the log-level of the dependent variable). If there is no significant 
cointegration relationship, then based on the difference specifications, long-term elasticities are 
calculated by adding up the coefficients of the contemporaneous and lagged variable (if they are 
statistically significant) divided by 1-the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable (if it is 
statistically significant).  
The estimations give us the elasticities. However, as suggested in Stockhammer et al. 
(2009), we are interested in the marginal (not proportional) effect of a change in π (R/Y) on C as a 
ratio to Y and I as a ratio to Y (i.e. 
)/(
/
YR
YI
∂
∂ and 
YR
YC
/
/
∂
∂ ) in order to eventually sum up the effects 
across different components of demand and find 𝜕𝑑
𝑑
 as a response to a 1%-point increase in R/Y. 
In the case of investment, iπ in Equation 3 is the elasticity of I with respect to π (R/Y), 
hence: 
I
YR
YR
I
YR
YR
I
I
YR
Ii /
)/(
)/(
)/()/log(
log
∂
∂
=
∂
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≅
∂
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=π       (C.1) 
Multiplying and dividing Equation D.4 by Y, we obtain 
I
R
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YI
I
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Y
Y
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∂
=
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Hence, the marginal effect of R/Y on I/Y is 
R
Ii
YR
YI
π=∂
∂
)/(
/ .           (C.3) 
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In converting the elasticity to the marginal effect on I/Y, we use the mean value of  I/R for 
the whole sample.  
 In the case of consumption, the elasticities of C with respect to R and W are Rc and cw in 
Equation 1 respectively. Note that in Equation 1 Rc is estimated for a given W. Same is true for cw 
where the elasticity is estimated for a given R. Hence: 
WWW |||log
log
C
R
R
C
R
R
C
C
R
CcR ∂
∂
=
∂
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≅
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∂
=        (C.4) 
and 
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log
C
W
W
C
W
W
C
C
W
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∂
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∂
≅
∂
∂
=        (C.5) 
Dividing and multiplying equations C.4 and C.5 gives 
WR C
R
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YCc |
/
/
∂
∂
=          (C.6) 
and 
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/
C
W
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YCcW ∂
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=          (C.7) 
Calculating the marginal effects gives (for a given level of W or R) 
WRW R
Cc
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YC ||
/
/
=
∂
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and 
RWR W
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YC ||
/
/
=
∂
∂          (C.9) 
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However, we know that W/Y=1-R/Y; hence for a given Y, i.e. prior to any multiplier 
effects, whenever there is an increase in R/Y, there is an equivalent fall in W/Y, and ∂ W/Y=-∂
R/Y. The aggregate effect of an increase of R/Y on C/Y combines effects from an increasing profit 
income and falling wage income for an initially constant Y: 
W
Cc
R
Cc
YR
YC
WR −=∂
∂
/
/         (C.10)
 
 
Obviously, the initial change in C and I will lead to changes in demand and Y, and to further 
changes in C and I via the multiplier mechanism as is discussed in Appendix D.  In converting the 
elasticities to the marginal effects, we multiplying the estimated elasticities of R and W by the mean 
values of C/R and C/W respectively for the whole sample.  
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Appendix D 
 
We can decompose the effects of a change in the profit shares in all countries simultaneously to 
national and global effects. The total effect is given by 
⎣
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   (D.1) 
where E is a diagonal nxn matrix, where the diagonal elements are the effect of a change in 
the profit share in country i on private excess demand (C+I+NX) in country i, calculated as in 
Equations 2, 4, and 511. 
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H is an nxn diagonal matrix, which shows the effect of an autonomous change in aggregate 
demand on C, I, and NX in each country and reflects the national multiplier: 
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11 To calculate the effect on imports a similar procedure to Equation 5 is followed:  
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In our case any change in private demand in country i will lead to a multiplier mechanism in 
that country, that is it will affect consumption, investment, and imports. The coefficient estimates in 
Tables 1, 2, and 6 give the elasticities of C, I, and M with respect to Y ( CYe , IYe , MYe respectively). 
For the elasticity of C with respect to Y, CYe , there is need for further calculation: CYe   is 
calculated as )1( ππ −+ CWCR ee , where CRe and CWe  are the elasticity of C with respect to profit 
and wage income respectively. Thus CYe is a weighted average of the elasticities of C with respect 
to R and W, where weights are the shares of R and W in Y (at sample mean). 
Again the elasticities have to be converted into partial effects. e.g.: 
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If the change in the profit share is isolated to a single country only, then in order to find the 
total effects of a change in πi on equilibrium aggregate demand in country i, private excess demand 
(Eii)  has to be multiplied by the standard multiplier: 
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The numerator is private excess demand, which is the diagonal element in matrix E for 
country i, that is, the change in private demand in country i caused by a change in income 
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distribution in country i for a given level of income. The term 1/(1- 
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Equation (D.7) is the standard national multiplier and is expected to be positive for stability.   
 The last two matrices in Equation D.1 reflect the global effects when there is a simultaneous 
change in π in all countries. P is an nxn matrix, which shows the effect of a change in a trade 
partner’s profit share, πj, on the net exports in each country i 
𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑛 =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡ 0 𝜕(𝛿𝛿𝑌 )1
𝜕𝛿2
𝑀21
𝑀1
⋯
𝜕(𝛿𝛿
𝑌
)1
𝜕𝛿𝑛
𝑀𝑛1
𝑀1
𝜕(𝛿𝛿
𝑌
)2
𝛿𝛿1
𝑀12
𝑀2
0 ⋮ 𝜕(𝛿𝛿𝑌 )2
𝛿𝛿𝑛
𝑀𝑛2
𝑀2
⋮ ⋯ ⋱ ⋮
𝜕(𝛿𝛿
𝑌
)𝑛
𝛿𝛿1
𝑀1𝑛
𝑀𝑛
𝜕(𝛿𝛿
𝑌
)𝑛
𝛿𝛿2
𝑀2𝑛
𝑀𝑛
⋯ 0 ⎦⎥⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
      (D.8) 
The diagonal elements of P are zero; the off-diagonal elements are calculated as: 
𝑃𝑖𝑖 = 𝜕(𝛿𝛿𝑌 )𝑖𝛿𝛿𝑗 𝑀𝑗𝑖𝑀𝑖 = (𝑒𝑃𝑥𝑖 11−eP jjj rulcYYf 1 ) 𝑀𝑗𝑖𝑀𝑖 (eXPi XiYi − MPie MiYi)   (D.9) 
The term in the first parentheses shows the effect of a change in the profit share of country j 
on its export prices (based on the elasticities as discussed above in Equation (5) in section 3). This 
change is weighted by the share of imports from country j to country i in country i’s total imports to 
reflect the effect on country i’s overall import prices. The last term calculates the effect of this 
change in import prices on country i’s exports-imports (using the elasticities of X and M to Px and 
Pm respectively), each weighted by the share of exports and imports in GDP.   
 W is an nxn matrix, which shows the effects of a change in a trade partner’s GDP on the 
exports of each country: 
𝑊𝑛𝑛𝑛 =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡ 0 𝑒𝑋𝑑𝑟𝑟1 𝑋1𝑑1 𝑑2𝑑𝑟 ⋯ 𝑒𝑋𝑑𝑟𝑟1 𝑋1𝑑1 𝑑𝑛𝑑𝑟
𝑒𝑋𝑑𝑟𝑟2
𝑋2
𝑑2
𝑑1
𝑑𝑟
0 ⋮ 𝑒𝑋𝑑𝑟𝑟2 𝑋2𝑑2 𝑑𝑛𝑑𝑟
⋮ ⋯ ⋱ ⋮
𝑒𝑋𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑛
𝑋𝑛
𝑑𝑛
𝑑1
𝑑𝑟
𝑒𝑋𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑛
𝑋𝑛
𝑑𝑛
𝑑2
𝑑𝑟
⋯ 0 ⎦⎥⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
     (D.10) 
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The diagonal elements of this matrix are zero, and the off-diagonal element, Wij, is the effect 
of a change in county j’s income on country i’s exports (as a ratio to GDP), and is calculated as the 
elasticity of exports of country i with respect to the GDP of the rest of the world (𝑒𝑋𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑖) multiplied 
by the share of exports in GDP in country i and weighted by the share of country j in world GDP 
(Yw). 
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Appendix E. 
Table E.1: Calculation of the marginal effect of a 1%-point increase in the profit share on net exports  
Sum
eP 1/(1-eP) ePx eXP eX.RULC RULC Yf/Y X/Y eM.P eM.RULC M/Y
A B C D E (B*C*D) F G H I (-E*G*H/F) J K (A*B*J) L M (-K*G*L/F) I-M
Euro area (12 c 0.624 2.660 0.184 -1.304 -0.637 0.619 0.893 0.062 0.057 0.000 0.000 0.068 0.000 0.057
Germany 0.618 2.617 0.274 -0.428 -0.307 0.615 0.900 0.214 0.096 0.000 0.000 0.209 0.000 0.096
France 0.577 2.363 0.148 -0.428 -0.150 0.615 0.867 0.171 0.036 0.481 0.656 0.175 -0.162 0.198
Italy 0.604 2.527 0.211 -0.273 -0.146 0.623 0.909 0.174 0.037 0.233 0.356 0.172 -0.089 0.126
UK 0.568 2.316 0.148 -0.519 -0.178 0.643 0.885 0.195 0.048 0.313 0.412 0.195 -0.110 0.158
US 0.369 1.585 0.138 -0.286 -0.063 0.634 0.926 0.068 0.006 0.428 0.250 0.085 -0.031 0.037
Japan 0.516 2.066 0.313 -0.428 -0.276 0.673 0.933 0.074 0.028 0.255 0.271 0.070 -0.026 0.055
Canada 0.459 1.849 0.148 -0.558 -0.153 0.601 0.884 0.278 0.063 0.617 0.524 0.264 -0.203 0.266
Australia 0.624 2.661 0.374 -0.235 -0.234 0.597 0.904 0.140 0.049 0.558 0.926 0.159 -0.223 0.272
Turkey 0.481 1.927 0.179 -1.613 -0.557 0.459 0.937 0.123 0.140 0.546 0.506 0.139 -0.144 0.283
Mexico 0.629 2.695 0.260 -0.621 -0.436 0.466 0.928 0.148 0.128 0.472 0.800 0.159 -0.253 0.381
Korea 0.735 3.779 0.336 -0.500 -0.636 0.753 0.891 0.237 0.178 0.216 0.600 0.255 -0.181 0.359
Argentina 0.640 2.780 0.107 -0.318 -0.095 0.507 0.975 0.079 0.014 0.745 1.327 0.070 -0.178 0.192
China 0.771 4.376 0.322 -1.945 -2.741 0.504 0.867 0.232 1.095 0.795 2.683 0.193 -0.891 1.986
India 0.756 4.106 0.693 -0.253 -0.718 0.753 0.914 0.091 0.080 0.546 1.695 0.112 -0.230 0.310
South Africa 0.618 2.620 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.624 0.921 0.237 0.000 1.002 1.624 0.211 -0.506 0.506
ImportsExports
π∂
∂ YX /
π∂
∂ YM /
π∂
∂ YNX /
 
Note: The marginal effect of a 1%-point increase in the profit share on exports (and imports) is -1*the effect of a 1%-point increase in the wage share on exports 
(and imports). Therefore in columns I and M, the values in columns E and K are multiplied by -1. 
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Appendix F 
Table F.1 shows the elasticities of C, I, and M with respect to Y (as given by the coefficient 
estimates in Tables 1, 2, and 6)  and the national multiplier for each country calculated as described 
in the diagonal elements of the H matrix in Appendix E.   
Table F.1. Elasticities of C, I, and M with respect to Y and the Multiplier 
h Multiplier
Euro area-12 0.551 1.020 2.035 0.371 1.590
Germany 0.516 0.913 1.911 0.071 1.076
France 0.494 2.050 1.963 0.280 1.388
Italy 0.539 2.610 2.136 0.422 1.730
United Kingdom 0.579 1.311 1.859 0.167 1.200
United States 0.387 3.105 1.996 0.519 2.080
Japan 0.464 1.840 1.136 0.584 2.407
Canada 0.499 1.780 1.505 0.176 1.214
Australia 0.324 2.021 1.886 0.291 1.410
Turkey 0.457 3.343 1.684 0.547 2.208
Mexico 0.471 1.406 2.591 0.097 1.108
Korea 0.725 2.509 2.265 0.452 1.824
Argentina 0.508 0.894 2.868 0.276 1.381
China 0.539 2.031 1.501 0.185 1.228
India 0.639 1.561 1.075 0.541 2.180
South Africa 0.632 1.912 1.199 0.327 1.487
CYe YIe MYe
 
 
 
 
 
